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UNCERTAINTY FOR PRACTITIONERS AND THE JUDICIARY 
AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR A MINIMUM STANDARD 
DEMONSTRATE THAT FIDUCIARY DUTIES SHOULD BE 
INCORPORATED INTO MARYLAND'S LLC ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose an individual decides to sue members or managers in a 
Maryland Limited Liability Company (LLC) for breach of their duty 
of care or duty of loyalty. I If the LLC operating agreement did not 
include written fiduciary duties, then Maryland courts would rely on 
Maryland's LLC statute. 2 However, upon referencing Maryland's 
LLC statute, the court would discover that the statute does not 
contain an express provision regulating the fiduciary duties of 
members or managers in an LLC. 3 Therefore, the court would be left 
to its own discretion to determine whether there was a breach of 
fiduciary duty.4 Lawyers advising clients who seek to sue for breach 
of fiduciary duty in a Maryland LLC face this same uncertainty 
because the Maryland LLC statute does not contain an express 
fiduciary standard. 5 In addition, there is uncertainty as to whether an 
operating agreement that includes an exculpatory provision would be 
upheld by the courts. 
Over the past three decades, the LLC has become a popular 
business form to utilize because of its extreme flexibility. 6 This 
extreme flexibility is encompassed in four main characteristics of the 
LLC: "(i) limited liability; (ii) partnership tax features; (iii) 
chameleon management-that is, the ability to choose between 
centralized and direct member-management; and (iv) creditor-
protection provisions.,,7 
1. See, e.g., Froelich v. Erickson, 96 F. Supp. 2d 507 (D. Md. 2000). 
2. See, e.g., id. at 520. 
3. See, e.g., id. 
4. See, e.g., id. at 526-27. 
5. See Elizabeth S. Miller, Are the Courts Developing a Unique Theory of Limited 
Liability Companies or Simply Borrowingfrom Other Forms?, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
617,632 (2009). 
6. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. 
LAW. 1,2 (\995). 
7. Id. 
285 
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Because the LLC is a relatively new business entity, issues linger 
regarding judicial interpretation of fiduciary duties for LLC members 
and managers. 8 When discussing fiduciary duties in LLCs, it has 
been commented that "[f]ew undertakings in the area of business 
associations law seem to generate quite as much controversy as does 
attempting to codify rules of fiduciary duty.,,9 
Upon reviewing various LLC statutes, it becomes clear that there is 
a lack of uniformity with respect to fiduciary duty provisions. to For 
example, while the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(RULLCA) and many state LLC statutes contain statutorily 
enumerated fiduciary duties, some provisions mirror partnerships, 
others mirror corporations, and some mirror both. 11 However, there 
are some state statutes, including Maryland's, which do not contain 
an express fiduciary duty provision. 12 
In 1992, the Maryland Legislature enacted the Maryland Limited 
Liability Company Act. l3 As of January 1, 1993, Maryland 
businesses could elect to form an LLC. 14 LLC statutes such as 
Maryland's can present problems for the judiciary because it forces 
courts to interpret the statute, creating an outcome that the legislature 
may not have intended when drafting the statute. 15 The state of 
Delaware has dealt with this very situation. 16 In Gotham Partners, 
L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., the Delaware court's 
interpretation of the LLC statute led to its later amendment by the 
legislature. 17 The incorporation of express fiduciary duties into the 
Maryland LLC Act would remove potential judiciary interpretation 
problems. 18 It could also create a minimum standard by which 
8. S. Mark Curwin, Conunent, Fiduciary Duty and the Minnesota Limited Liability 
Company: Sufficient Protection of Member Interests?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 989, 
990 (1993). 
9. Franklin A. Gevurtz, California's New Limited Liability Company Act: A Look at the 
Good, the Bad, and the Ambiguous, 27 PAC. L.J. 261,267 (1996). 
10. See Miller, supra note 5, at 634 ("The LLC statutes across the country reflect a variety 
of approaches toward fiduciary duties of members and managers."); see also Mary 
Szto, Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 23 
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 61,65 (2004) ("LLC statutes take three main approaches in terms 
of fiduciary duties. "). 
II. See infra Part IV. 
12. See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A (LexisNexis 2007). 
13. H.D. 373,1992 Leg., 406th Sess. (Md. 1992). 
14. !d. 
IS. See, e.g., Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160 
(Del. 2002). 
16. See id. 
17. !d. at 167-<:i8. 
18. See infra Part VI.A. 
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members and managers can be held to without frustrating the purpose 
behind LLCs. 19 
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief history of the LLC, 
detailing the purpose behind the formation of the LLC. 20 Part III will 
analyze how partnership acts, particularly the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act (RUPA),21 and corporation acts, specifically the 
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),22 have handled fiduciary 
duties. 23 Part III will also compare and contrast the partnership and 
corporate fiduciary models. 24 Part IV will focus on four different 
approaches to fiduciary duties in LLC statutes: (1) the partnership 
approach, (2) the corporate approach, (3) the hybrid approach, and 
(4) the Delaware approach. 25 Part V will analyze Maryland's 
approach to fiduciary duties and the reasons behind its approach. 26 
Part VI will articulate the reasons for incorporating statutorily 
defined fiduciary duties into the Maryland LLC Act. 27 Finally, part 
VII will provide a proposed four-part fiduciary standard for Maryland 
LLCs. 28 The overarching goal of this comment is to demonstrate the 
need for an express fiduciary duty provision to be incorporated into 
the Maryland LLC Act. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LLC 
The LLC came into existence as a response to the growing demand 
for a business organization that afforded owners limited liability 
19. See infra Part VLB. 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part lILA; UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1997), 6 u.L.A. Even though the word 
"revised" is not in the official title to the 1997 Act, it is referenced as RUP A in 
literature on the Act and will be referred to as RUP A in this Comment. The 1997 
version of RUPA was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and has been adopted by thirty-six states. A Few 
Facts About the Uniform Partnership Act (1994)(1997), NCCUSL, 
http://www.nccusl.orglUpdate/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa9497.asp (last 
visited Jan. 10,2011). 
22. See infra Part III.B. The Model Business Corporations Act was prepared by the 
Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association (ABA) and has been 
adopted by approximately thirty-two states. Corporate Laws, ABA, 
http://www.abanet.orgidch/committee.cfm?com=CL270000 (last visited Jan. 10, 
2011). 
23. See infra Part III.B. 
24. See infra Part IILe. 
25. See infra Part IV. 
26. See infra Part V. 
27. See infra Part VI. 
28. See infra Part VII. 
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without the double tax regime of the corporation. 29 The first state 
LLC statute was adopted by Wyoming in 1977; it integrated 
provisions from the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), the 
Unifonn Limited Partnership Act (ULP A), and the Unifonn 
Partnership Act (UP A). 30 In 1988, the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) issued Revenue Ruling 88-76, which stated that a Wyoming 
LLC would be subject to partnership taxation. 31 Once the IRS 
recognized the LLC as a partnership for tax purposes, interest in the 
LLC soared. 32 Many states quickly adopted LLC statutes to take 
advantage of the LLC's flexibility, and by 1995 all fifty states had 
adopted LLC statutes. 33 A recent survey indicated that thirty-seven 
state LLC statutes have express provisions articulating a fiduciary 
standard for members. 34 
As a result of the increase in use of the LLC, the IRS spent an 
increased amount of time and energy fielding questions regarding the 
specific classification of LLCs for tax purposes. 35 In order to 
simplify the LLC's detennination of classification for tax purposes, 
the IRS issued the 1997 "check-the-box" procedure. 36 This 
procedure allowed an LLC to elect partnership tax status. 37 Prior to 
1997, an LLC was taxed as a corporation if it contained more than 
two of the four corporate attributes, which consisted of: (1) continuity 
of life; (2) centralized management; (3) limited liability; or (4) free 
transferability of interests. 38 
The LLC was created as a hybrid entity combining the liability 
protection of a corporation with the tax advantages of a partnership 
and allowing for either centralized or decentralized management. 39 
The purpose behind the creation of the LLC was to provide greater 
29. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIB STEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1:2 (Thomson Reuter/West 20 I 0). 
30. Szto, supra note 10, at 64. 
31. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
32. RIB STEIN & KEA TINGE, supra note 29, § 1:2. 
33. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING 
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, 1183 (11th ed. 2010). 
34. RiB STEIN & KEA TINGE, supra note 29, app. 9-7. 
35. Id. § 1:2. 
36. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 33, at 1185. 
37. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1997). 
38. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1996); see also Szto, supra note 10, at 65 
(summarizing the federal regulations). 
39. Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After 
More than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 567 (2006). 
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flexibility in tax and business planning. 40 Additionally, the LLC was 
created as a response to business owners' desire for a framework that 
prevented judicial intervention into business transactions that they 
had negotiated. 41 
The LLC not only offers business owners limited liability with 
partnership tax features, but it also allows flexibility in the 
management and control of the LLC.42 There are two distinct 
management forms that LLC business owners typically utilize: the 
member-managed model and the manager-managed mode1. 43 In a 
member-managed LLC, members have authority to act on behalf of 
the LLC in the ordinary course of business. 44 This agency authority 
to act on behalf of the LLC is similar in nature to the decentralized 
management found in partnerships. 45 Thus, member-managed LLCs 
are sometimes referred to as the "partnership model.,,46 
Unlike a member-managed LLC, in a manager-managed LLC, the 
managers, and not the members, have the authority to act on behalf of 
the LLC. 47 Because there is no requirement that the managers be 
members, a manager-managed LLC provides the ability to separate 
ownership from authority. 48 Therefore, because of their centralized 
management, manager-managed LLCs have, at times, been referred 
to as the "corporate model.,,49 In most cases, statutes will provide 
that the election for either member-managed or manager-managed 
must be stated in the articles of organization. 50 Generally, if the 
parties do not specifically state in the LLC operating agreement that 
40. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the 
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 
152U.PA.L.REv.1609,161O(2004). 
41. !d. 
42. See id. at 1609-11; Ribstein, supra note 6, at 10; see also Thomas E. Rutledge, The 
Lost Distinction Between Agency and Decisional Authority: Unfortunate 
Consequences of the Member-Managed Versus Manager-Managed Distinction in the 
Limited Liability Company, 93 Ky. L.J. 737 (2004) (discussing the differences 
between member-managed and manager-managed LLCs). 
43. Rutledge, supra note 42, at 737. 
44. Id. at 739-40. 
45. Id. at 740. 
46. Id. at 740-41. 
47. !d. at 741. 
48. Id. at 741-42. 
49. Id. at 742 ("This model is sometimes referred to as the 'corporate model' because 
ownership (member or shareholder) is entirely separated from agency authority 
(manager or officer)."). 
50. Id. at 737. 
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managerial authority is vested in a manager, then the authority is 
vested in the members by default. 51 
As a result of the LLC's flexibility, members are able to establish 
almost any economic and management structure they desire. 52 
However, this flexibility does not corne without a cost. 53 Members 
must think: through more aspects of the organizational relationship 
than in more restrictive organizational forms, such as the partnership 
or the corporation. 54 
III. PARTNERSHIP AND CORPORATE APPROACHES TO 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
The LLC combines the features of both a partnership and a 
corporation, allowing for limited liability, the option of partnership 
tax status, and the choice of either centralized or decentralized 
management. 55 Fiduciary duties in LLC statutes likewise reflect 
aspects of a corporation and a partnership; therefore, it is necessary to 
review both approaches to fiduciary duties in order to understand the 
basis for many statutory LLC fiduciary duty provisions. 56 
Generally, in both partnership and corporate law, fiduciary duties 
include both a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. 57 RUP A provides 
an example of fiduciary duties in a partnership. 58 The MBCA 
provides an example of fiduciary duties in the corporate context. 59 
A. RUPA 's Approach to Fiduciary Duties 
RUP A represents a model that permits for limited contractual 
freedom because of statutorily provided default rules that apply in the 
absence of an agreement between the parties. 60 Section 404(a) of 
RUPA provides that a partner's only fiduciary duties to the 
partnership and other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
51. Gevurtz, supra note 9, at 263--{;4. 
52. RIBSTEIN & KEA TINGE, supra note 29, § 1 :3. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
55. See id. § 2: 1. 
56. See Miller, supra note 39, at 567. 
57. Miller, supra note 40, at 1622. 
58. J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom o/Contract, 
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 29 (1995). 
59. See Thomas E. Rutledge, External Entities and Internal Aggregates: A 
Deconstructionist Conundrum, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 655, 663 (2009) (noting that 
"the MBCA [is] the most broadly accepted model for corporation laws"); see also 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REv. 833, 844 (2005). 
60. Miller, supra note 40, at 1616. 
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care. 61 When writing section 404(a), the drafters of RUPA intended 
to limit the scope of fiduciary duties that partners would owe to each 
other. 62 The drafters of RUP A were able to achieve this by clearly 
incorporating into section 404(a) statutorily enumerated fiduciary 
duties. 63 In addition, the drafters wanted to prevent the possible 
expansion or alteration of fiduciary duties by courts. 64 By narrowing 
the fiduciary duties in section 404(a), the drafters ofRUPA sought to 
increase the dependability of the partnership agreement. 65 This, in a 
sense, gave greater freedom of contract to those drafting the 
partnership agreement, but there is a limitation to this freedom. 66 
While partners are afforded freedom of contract in drafting the 
partnership agreement, they are limited by the inability to completely 
eliminate certain fiduciary duties. 67 
Section 404(c) of RUPA defines a partner's duty of care as 
refraining from engaging in "grossly negligent conduct.,,68 The 
official comment to section 404, states that "grossly negligent 
conduct" is generally what many courts have recognized when 
analyzing a partner's duty of care. 69 In order to avoid grossly 
negligent conduct, a partner must perform his duty with some degree 
of skill. 70 In Rosenthal v. Rosenthal,71 the Supreme Court of Maine 
stated that a partner's duty of care to the other partners and the 
partnership is to refrain from grossly negligent or willful 
misconduct. 72 
61. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a), 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997). 
62. See Hynes, supra note 58, at 32 ("[O]ne would expect to see a word like 'includes' 
instead of 'only' in recognition of the inherent inability of the law to draw clear, sharp 
lines in defining fiduciary duties. Such wording would leave room for modification 
and expansion of fiduciary duties as circumstances present themselves."). 
63. See id. 
64. /d. at 32-33 ("One source of this uncertainty is the fear that courts may create new 
fiduciary duties or stretch existing fiduciary duties into unrecognizable form, 
undermining the parties' true understanding as expressed in the partnership 
agreement."). 
65. /d. at 34. 
66. Id. 
67. /d. 
68. "A partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and 
winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in 
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation 
oflaw." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(c), 6 U.L.A 875 (1997). 
69. Id. § 404 cmt. 3. 
70. See id. § 404(c). 
71. 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988). 
72. See id. at 352. 
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Section 404(b) articulates a partner's duty of loyalty to the 
partnership. 73 A partner's entire duty of loyalty is divided into three 
distinct rules: (1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for 
it any benefit that the partner derives from it and refrain from taking a 
partnership opportunity for oneself, (2) engaging in conduct that is 
adverse to the partnership, and (3) to refrain from competing with the 
partnership. 74 The first rule allows the partnership to recover any 
money or property that can be traced to the partnership from a partner 
who has seized a partnership opportunity. 75 Pursuant to the second 
rule, a partner has a duty to refrain from engaging in conduct adverse 
to the partnership until the partner dissociates. 76 Finally, under the 
third rule, a partner has a duty not to compete with the partnership. 77 
As with most of the RUP A provisions, fiduciary duties can be 
altered in the partnership agreement, but they cannot be completely 
eliminated, as provided in section 404( a). 78 Section 1 03(b), titled 
"Nonwaiveable Provisions," prevents the complete elimination of the 
duty of loyalty and the duty of care. 79 Section 1 03(b )(3) prevents the 
partnership agreement from completely eliminating the duty of 
loyalty, but allows partners to reduce it by specifying categories that 
do not violate the duty, so long as they are not unreasonable. 80 
Similarly, section 103(b)(4) prevents the partnership agreement from 
73. A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other 
partners is limited to the following: (1) to account to the 
partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or 
benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of 
the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of 
partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership 
opportunity; (2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the 
conduct or winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf 
of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; and (3) to 
refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the 
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership. 
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b). 
74. Id. 
75. /d. § 404 cmt. 2. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. /d. § 103(b)(3)-(4). 
79. /d. 
80. Id. § 103(b )(3)(i) ("The partnership agreement may not: eliminate the duty of loyalty 
under Section 404(b) ... , but: (i) the partnership agreement may identify specific 
types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly 
unreasonable .... "). 
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unreasonably reducing the duty of care. 81 The official comment to 
section 103 explains that a need to protect against "unequal 
bargaining power, information, or sophistication" is a reason for 
having mandatory fiduciary duties. 82 
Maryland's partnership statute is generally consistent with 
RUP A. 83 Specifically, Maryland's partnership statute has language 
in the duty of care,84 duty of loyalty,85 and exculpatory86 provisions 
that are similar to RUP A. 87 
81. Id. § 103(b)(4) ("The partnership agreement may not: (4) unreasonably reduce the 
duty of care under Section 404(c) .... "). 
82. Id. § 103 cmt. 4; see also Hynes, supra note 58, at 37. In a letter to the drafters of 
RUPA, which played a prominent role in incorporating mandatory fiduciary duties, 
Professor Eisenberg argued: 
[T]hat owing to the uncertain and fluid nature of many partnerships, it is 
almost impossible to anticipate ways in which a provision overriding fiduciary 
duties can be abused by an opportunistic partner, and thus either section 103 
should be dropped altogether, returning to the format of the UP A, or fiduciary 
rules should be included as mandatory duties under section 103. 
Hynes, supra note 58, at 47. Other commentators have noted that allowing a total 
waiver of fiduciary duties creates the possibility of deadlock during negotiations. See 
e.g., Richard A. Booth, Fiduciary Duty, Contract, and Waiver in Partnerships and 
Limited Liability Companies, 1 1. SMALL & EMERGING BuS. L. 55, 61 (1997). By 
allowing a total wavier of fiduciary duties, parties may never reach an agreement 
because they cannot be sure of the degree to which they must give up other 
opportunities they may wish to protect. Id. 
83. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 9A-103(b)(3)--{4), 9A-404(a)--{c) 
(LexisNexis 2007). 
84. Compare UN1F. P'SHIP ACT § 404(c), 6 U.L.A 875 (1997), with MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-404(c) (LexisNexis 2007), which provides, "[a] partner's duty 
of care to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding up of the 
partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or 
reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law." 
85. Compare UNIF. P'SHIPAcT § 404(b), with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-
404(b) (LexisNexis 2007), which provides that 
[a] partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other 
partners is limited to the following: (I) To account to the 
partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or 
benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of 
the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of 
partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership 
opportunity; (2) To refrain from dealing with the partnership in 
the conduct or winding up of the partnership business as or on 
behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; and 
(3) To refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct 
of the partnership business before the dissolution of the 
partnership. 
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B. MBCA 's Approach to Fiduciary Duties 
The MBCA represents a model of fiduciary duties in the corporate 
context. 88 Subchapter C of the MBCA lays out the fiduciary duties 
that a director owes to the corporation, which includes the duty of 
care and the duty of loyalty. 89 A director is expected to act in the best 
interest of the corporation when fulfilling his duties to the 
corporation. 90 
Section 8.30(b) requires directors, as they become informed with 
their decision-making function and oversight responsibility, to carry 
out these duties with the care of a reasonably prudent person in the 
same or similar circumstances. 91 The official comment to section 
8.30(b) notes that the general standard of conduct is focused on the 
manner in which the director becomes informed with respect to his 
oversight and decision-making function, and not the correctness of 
the decision itself. 92 The official comment to section 8.30(b) also 
provides that in exercising a director's duty of care, it is not what a 
particular director would believe to be appropriate, but what a person 
in a similar position acting under similar circumstances would 
reasonably believe to be appropriate. 93 
Related to a director's duty of care is the business judgment rule, 
which creates a rebuttable presumption that the directors are acting 
on an informed basis. 94 The business judgment rule, for the most 
86. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3}-(4) (stating that a partnership may not 
unreasonably reduce the duty of care or eliminate the duty of loyalty), with MD. CODE 
ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-103(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2007) ("The partnership 
agreement may not: (4) [ulnreasonably reduce the duty of care under § 9A-404(c) ... 
of this title."), and MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 9A-103(b)(3) (LexisNexis 
2007) ("The partnership agreement may not: (3) [elliminate the duty of loyalty under 
§ 9A-404(b) ... of this title, but: (i) [tlhe partnership agreement may identify specific 
types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty ofloyalty .... "). 
87. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a), with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9A-
404(a) (LexisNexis 2007) ("The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the 
partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth 
in subsections (b) and (c) of this section."). 
88. See supra note 22. 
89. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a}-(b) (2008). 
90. Id. § 8.30(a) ("Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of 
the director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably 
believes to be in the best interest of the corporation."). 
91. Id. § 8.30(b). 
92. Id. § 8.30(b) cmt. 2. 
93. !d. 
94. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (De\. 1985). Some state statutes, such 
as Maryland's, have chosen to codify the business judgment rule, but others still 
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part, is not codified in statute but is instead well established in case 
law. 95 Pursuant to the duty of care and business judgment rule, the 
director will not be held liable even though the decision itself was not 
that of a reasonably prudent person, so long as the director acts in 
good faith and with due care in the "process sense.,,96 Courts and 
commentators have noted specific policy reasons supporting the 
application of the business judgment rule, which include (1) avoiding 
judicial intrusion into business decisions, (2) encouraging directors to 
take risks without looking over their shoulder's, and (3) not deterring 
individuals from taking director positions. 97 Judges are not as well-
versed in the difficult business decisions that directors are faced with 
and have readily admitted it. 98 In Shlensky v. Wrigley, the court 
clearly stated that "judges are not business experts.,,99 In addition, 
judges typically lack the ability to fully understand the specific 
circumstances that confront a business. lOo Another reason supporting 
the application of the business judgment rule is that directors need to 
be given the freedom to take risks on behalf of a corporation. 101 
Shareholders and corporations benefit from directors being able to 
take various business risks, such as diversifying the corporation's 
stock portfolio. 102 Finally, the application of the business judgment 
follow the common law. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-405.1 (a) (LexisNexis 
2007); see, e.g., Smith, 488 A.2d at 872. 
95. Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the 
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board's Decision to Engage in Social 
Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 623, 636 (2007). For a codified version of the 
business judgment rule, see PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1994): 
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith 
fulfills the duty under this Section if the director or officer: (l) is 
not interested [§ 1.23] in the subject of the business judgment; (2) 
is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to 
the extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be 
appropriate under the circumstances; and (3) rationally believes 
that the business judgment is in the best interests of the 
corporation. 
96. Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care 
and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 BuS. LAW. 1237,1238 (1986). 
97. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Lyman P.Q. 
Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus. LAW. 439, 455 
(2005). 
98. Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780. 
99. /d. 
100. Johnson, supra note 97, at 456. 
101. /d. 
102. See id. 
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rule prevents the possibility of deterring people from taking director 
positions with the corporation. 103 If a poor business decision results 
in a corporation losing money, a rule that too readily holds directors 
liable would certainly deter people from taking director positions. 104 
A director's duty of loyalty includes the duty to neither engage in a 
self-dealing transaction nor usurp a corporate opportunity. 105 A self-
dealing transaction is defined by section 8.60(1) as a transaction 
where the director is a party to the transaction or where the director 
has a material financial interest in the transaction. 106 However, 
section 8.61(b), which is considered the "safe harbor" provision, 
affords a director's self-dealing transaction protection in certain 
circumstances. 107 Pursuant to section 8.61(b), a self-dealing 
transaction is not considered voidable by the corporation if it has 
been approved by disinterested shareholders or directors, or the 
interested director establishes the fairness of the transaction to the 
corporation. 108 
Another situation that can trigger a director's duty of loyalty is 
usurping a corporate opportunity.109 The official comment to section 
8.70 defines the common law doctrine of corporate opportunity as the 
right a corporation has prior to its directors to act on certain business 
opportunities. 110 If a director acts on that opportunity without first 
presenting it to the corporation, the director is held to have "usurped" 
the right of the corporation. III Section 8.70(a) is a safe harbor 
provision that affords a director protection when taking a corporate 
opportunity. 112 
103. Id. at 455-56. 
104. Id.at455. 
105. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60(1),8.70 (2009). 
106. !d. § 8.60(1). 
107. A director's conflicting interest transaction may not be the subject 
of equitable relief, or give rise to an award of damages or other 
sanctions against a director, in a proceeding by a shareholder or 
by or in the right of the corporation, on the ground that the 
director has an interest respecting the transaction, if: (I) directors' 
action respecting the transaction was taken in compliance with 
section 8.62 at any time; or (2) shareholders' action respecting the 
transaction was taken in compliance with section 8.63 at any time; 
or (3) the transaction, judged according to the circumstances at the 
relevant time, is established to have been fair to the corporation. 
!d. § 8.61(b). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. § 8.70. 
110. Id. § 8.70 cmt. 
Ill. Id. 
112. A director's taking advantage, directly or indirectly, ofa business 
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The American Law Institute (ALI) defines a corporate opportunity 
as (1) an opportunity to engage in a business activity that a director 
becomes aware of either (a) in connection with the performance of 
their job or under circumstances that would lead a reasonable director 
to believe that the person offering the opportunity expects it to be 
offered to the corporation, or (b) through the use of corporate 
information or property, if the resulting opportunity is one in which 
the director should reasonably believe would be of interest to the 
corporation; or (2) any opportunity to engage in a business activity 
that a director becomes aware of and knows is closely related to the 
business in which the corporation is engaged or expects to be 
engaged in. 113 If it is established that an opportunity is a corporate 
opportunity, a director may not take advantage of a corporate 
opportunity unless (1) the director first offers the corporate 
opportunity to the corporation making full disclosure concerning the 
conflict or interest; (2) the opportunity is rejected by the corporation; 
and (3) either the rejection is fair to the corporation, or the rejection is 
made in advance by disinterested directors or by disinterested 
shareholders. 114 
Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris ll5 serves as an example 
of a court applying the corporate opportunity doctrine. 116 In that case, 
opportunity may not be the subject of equitable relief, or give rise 
to an award of damages or other sanctions against the director, in 
a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation on the ground 
that such opportunity should have first been offered to the 
corporation, if before becoming legally obligated respecting the 
opportunity the director brings it to the attention of the 
corporation and: (I) action by qualified directors disclaiming the 
corporation's interest in the opportunity is taken in compliance 
with the procedures set forth in section 8.62, as if the decision 
being made concerned a director's conflicting interest transaction, 
or (2) shareholders' action disclaiming the corporation's interest 
in the opportunity is taken in compliance with the procedures set 
forth in section 8.63, as if the decision being made concerned a 
director's conflicting interest transaction; except that, rather than 
making "required disclosure" as defined in section 8.60, in each 
case the director shall have made prior disclosure to those acting 
on behalf of the corporation of all material facts concerning the 
business opportunity that are then known to the director. 
Id. § 8.70(a). 
113. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05(b) (1994). 
114. Id. § 5.05(a). 
115. 661 A.2d 1146 (Me. 1995). 
116. !d. at 1146. 
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the plaintiff, Northeast Harbor Golf Club, alleged that the defendant, 
the former president of the corporation, usurped a corporate 
opportunity when the defendant purchased and developed real estate 
adjacent to the golf club.117 In reaching its holding, the Supreme 
Court of Maine applied the ALI approach to the corporate 
opportunity doctrine. liS First, the court held that if the fact-finder 
believed that the property was offered to the defendant specifically in 
her capacity as the president of the Golf Club, then it would be 
considered a corporate opportunity. 119 Second, the court held that if 
the defendant had failed to offer the opportunity at all to the 
corporation, then she could not claim that the taking of the 
opportunity was, in fact, fair. 120 The court was forced to remand the 
case for further factual findings. 121 
The MBCA allows fiduciary duties to be altered in the articles of 
incorporation, but the articles cannot completely eliminate a 
director's fiduciary duties.122 Section 2.02(b )(4) enumerates specific 
instances in which the articles prohibit the limiting or elimination of 
liability on behalf of a director to the corporation. 123 The articles 
cannot limit or eliminate a director's liability to the corporation for 
(1) a financial benefit received by the director which he is not entitled 
to, (2) intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or 
shareholders, (3) an unlawful distribution, and (4) intentional 
violation of a criminal law. 124 
Maryland's corporation statute is, in principle, consistent with the 
MBCA. 125 A leading commentator in Maryland corporate law, James 
J. Hanks, has noted that the duty of care 126 and the business judgment 
117. Id. at 1148. 
118. Id. at 11S2. 
119. Id.atIIS1. 
120. !d. at IISI-S2. 
121. !d.atllS2. 
122. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2009). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
12S. Compare. e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-40S.2 (LexisNexis 2007) 
(pennitting the corporation to limit or expand a director's or officer's liability), with 
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (providing that articles of incorporation may 
limit or expand a director's liability). 
126. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)-(b) (2009), with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. 
&ASS'NS § 2-40S.1(a) (LexisNexis 2007): 
A director shall perfonn his duties as a director, including his duties as a 
member of a committee of the board on which he serves: (1) [i]n good 
faith; (2) [i]n a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of 
the corporation; and (3) [w]ith the care that an ordinarily prudent person 
in a like position would use under similar circumstances. 
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rule l27 in Maryland's corporate statute are similar to the MBCA.128 
Similar to the MBCA duty of care provision, Hanks notes that 
Maryland's duty of care provision is aimed at the manner or process 
by which a director makes a decision and not the result of those 
decisions.129 Hanks further notes that section 2-405( e) serves as a 
codified version of the business judgment rule. 130 Also, the language 
contained in Maryland's corporate statute for self-interested 
transactions is similar to the MBCA. 131 Maryland, like the MBCA, 
also follows the corporate opportunity doctrine. 132 According to 
Hanks, the corporate opportunity doctrine stands for the proposition 
that corporate personnel are prohibited from diverting corporate 
opportunities for themselves. 133 Also, Maryland has adopted the 
127. MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 2-40S.l(e) (LexisNexis 2007) ("An act of a 
director of a corporation is presumed to satisfy the standards of subsection (a) of this 
section."). 
128. JAMES J. HANKS, JR., MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW §§ 6.6(b), 6.8 (Supp. 2008). 
129. Id. at § 6.6(b). 
130. Id. at § 6.8 (Supp. 2007). 
131. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.60(1), with MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 
2-419(a) (LexisNexis 2007), which provides that 
[i]f subsection (b) of this section is complied with, a contract or 
other transaction between a corporation and any of its directors or 
between a corporation and any other corporation, firm, or other 
entity in which any of its directors is a director or has a material 
financial interest is not void or voidable solely because of anyone 
or more of the following: (I) [t]he common directorship or 
interest; (2) [t]he presence of the director at the meeting of the 
board or a committee of the board which authorizes, approves, or 
ratifies the contract or transaction; or (3) [t]he counting of the vote 
of the director for the authorization, approval, or ratification of the 
contract or transaction. 
and MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-419(b), which provides that 
[s]ubsection (a) of this section applies if: (I) [t]he fact of the 
common directorship or interest is disclosed or known to: (i) [t]he 
board of directors or the committee, and the board or committee 
authorizes approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction by the 
affirmative vote of a majority of disinterested directors, even if 
the disinterested directors constitute less than a quorum; or (ii) 
[t]he stockholders entitled to vote, and the contract or transaction 
is authorized, approved, or ratified by a majority of the votes cast 
by the stockholders entitled to vote other than the votes of shares 
owned of record or beneficially by the interested director or 
corporation, firm, or other entity; or (2) [t]he contract or 
transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation. 
132. See HANKS, supra note 128, at § 6.23 (Supp. 2007). 
133. !d. 
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"interest or reasonable expectancy" test for detennining whether a 
director has usurped a corporate opportunity.'34 Finally, Maryland's 
corporate statute contains exculpatory language that is consistent with 
the MBCA. '35 
C. Similarities and Differences Between Partnership and Corporate 
Approaches to Fiduciary Duties 
Partnerships and corporations are governed by express fiduciary 
standards. While there are some notable similarities, there are also 
some differences. 136 One similarity between the partnership and 
corporate approaches to fiduciary duties is that both business entities 
recognize the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 137 Another 
similarity between the partnership and corporate approach to 
fiduciary duties is the inability to completely eliminate fiduciary 
duties. 138 
134. Id. 
135. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b), with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 
2-405.2 (LexisNexis 2007) ("The charter of the corporation may include any provision 
expanding or limiting the liability of its directors and officers to the corporation or its 
stockholders as described under § 5-418 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article."). 
136. One can attribute the difference between partnership and corporate fiduciary standards 
to the polar-opposite management and control styles. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 
401(f), 6 U.L.A. 133 (1997) ("Each partner has equal rights in the management and 
conduct of the partnership business."), with MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) ("All 
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of 
directors" and the "business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or 
under the direction" of the board of directors.). Most partnerships have decentralized 
management, meaning that all the partners have an equal share in the management and 
control of the partnership. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 40 I (e}-(f); see also RiB STEIN & 
KEA TINGE, supra note 29, § 8: 16. The decentralized management structure of a 
partnership plays a role in allowing partners more leeway in acting in their own best 
interests. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. Corporations on the other 
hand usually have centralized management to separate out those with ownership, the 
shareholders, from those with authority to act on behalf of the corporation, the 
directors, or officers. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b); see also RlBSTEIN & 
KEATINGE, supra note 29, § 8:15. The centralized management structure of a 
corporation places a more stringent requirement on the directors to not act in their 
own self-interest when it conflicts with the best interests of the corporation. See infra 
note 153 and accompanying text. 
137. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a) (stating that a partner has the duty of care and the 
duty ofloyalty), with MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a}-(b) (establishing the duty of 
care and the duty ofloyalty for directors). 
138. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3}-(4) (prohibiting a partnership agreement from 
eliminating the duty of loyalty or unreasonably reducing the duty of care), with 
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The duty of care standard itself does not differ much between a 
partnership and a corporation. But unlike corporations, the 
uncertainty surrounding the application of the business judgment rule 
to partnerships is a notable difference. 139 In a partnership, the duty of 
care standard is to refrain from "grossly negligent" conduct, meaning 
that a partner must perform his responsibilities to the partnership and 
other partners with some degree of skill. 140 By contrast, in a 
corporation, the duty of care standard for a director is to act with the 
care of a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar 
circumstances in becoming informed in connection with their 
oversight duties and decision-making function. 141 Also in the 
corporate context, the duty of care is subject to the business judgment 
rule. 142 Some courts and commentators have found that the business 
judgment rule does not apply in the partnership context. 143 For 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Adochio agreed that application of the 
business judgment rule is inappropriate in the partnership context 
because its protection is restricted to the corporate setting. 144 Thus, it 
could be argued that it is much more difficult to show a violation of 
the duty of care in the corporate context because there is a 
presumption that the directors are acting in the best interest of the 
corporation. 145 
However, courts in other jurisdictions have applied the business 
judgment rule to general partnerships.146 For instance, the Court of 
Appeals of South Carolina in Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assocs. held that 
the business judgment rule may apply to partnerships. 147 In order for 
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (restricting the ability to eliminate or limit the 
liability of a director). 
139. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(c) (stating that a partner may not engage in "grossly 
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of 
law"), with MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (requiring that directors "discharge their 
duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe 
appropriate under similar circumstances"). 
140. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(c). 
141. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) cmt. 2. 
142. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (De\. 1985). 
143. See, e.g., Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Adochio, 138 F.3d 491, 502 (3rd Cir. 1998); 
Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and 
Reasonable Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business 
Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 343 (2005). 
144. Henkels, 138 F.3d at 502. 
145. See Miller & Rutledge, supra note 143, at 345-46. 
146. See, e.g., Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assocs., 538 S.E.2d 15,26 (S.c. Ct. App. 2000). 
147. !d. at 27. 
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the business judgment rule to apply, "the allegedly violating partner 
must show he acted: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances; and (3) in a manner the partner reasonably believes to 
be in the best interests ofthe partnership." 148 However, the court held 
that the business judgment rule would not apply where the partner 
had engaged in self-dealing transactions, fraud, or other 
unconscionable conduct. 149 
A subtle difference can be found in the duty of loyalty standards of 
a partnership and a corporation. ISO In a partnership, a partner is given 
more leeway in carrying out his duty of loyalty. 151 While a partner 
must refrain from self-dealing transactions and usurping a partnership 
opportunity,IS2 RUP A section 404( e) permits a partner to act in his 
own best interests without violating his fiduciary duties to the other 
partners or the partnerships.ls3 By contrast, in a corporation, a 
director's duty of loyalty to the corporation ensures that a director's 
self interests do not conflict with the interests of the corporation. 154 
IV. VARIOUS STATUTORY APPROACHES TO FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES IN THE LLC CONTEXT 
A problem that has continued to plague the LLC during its 
development has been the lack of uniformity regarding a statutorily 
defined fiduciary standard. 155 This can be attributed, in part, to 
conflicting IRS rulings that were issued during the early development 
stages of the LLC. IS6 Both partnership and corporate statutes contain 
express fiduciary duties. ls7 The LLC combines the features of both a 
148. Jd. 
149. Id. 
150. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b), 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997) (requiring partners to hold 
any profit, property, or benefit acquired in the course of partnership business in trust 
for the partnership; refrain from dealing with the partnership as an adverse party; and 
not compete with the partnership), with MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2009) 
(requiring directors to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation). 
151. UNIF. P'sHiPAcT § 404(e). 
152. Id. § 404(b)(1). 
153. Id. § 404(e). 
154. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
155. Szto, supra note 10, at 63. 
156. Id. ("Because of early conflicting IRS rulings, however, LLCs did not become popular 
until several years after the first LLC statute was passed. Also, conflicting IRS 
rulings led to varied LLC statutes and fiduciary standards."). 
157. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30(a)-(c), 8.62(a)-(b) 
(2009). 
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partnership and a corporation. 158 Therefore, many LLC statutes have 
incorporated fiduciary standards that mirror a partnership, a 
corporation, or even both. 159 
Many LLC statutes contain some form of statutorily enumerated 
fiduciary duties. 160 Illinois and California LLC statutes more closely 
reflect the fiduciary duties found in a partnership. 161 By contrast, 
Virginia and New York LLC statutes reflect the corporate fiduciary 
standard. 162 The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(RULLCA) 163 applies principles found in both partnership and 
corporate statutes. 164 Finally, Delaware's LLC statute allows for the 
operating agreement to control, either expanding or even completely 
eliminating fiduciary duties. 165 
A. LLC Statutes Adopting the Partnership Approach to Fiduciary 
Duties 
Some LLC statutes have followed the partnership approach to 
fiduciary duties. 166 This comment will analyze Illinois's and 
California's LLC statutes, both of which draw a distinction between 
member-managed and manager-managed LLCs and incorporate an 
expressed fiduciary duty provision. 
1. Illinois's Approach to Fiduciary Duties 
Illinois's LLC statute clearly draws a distinction 
member-managed and a manager-managed LLC. 167 
IS8. Miller, supra note 39, at S67. 
between a 
Illinois's 
IS9. Miller, supra note 5, at 635 ("Statutory articulations of duties and standards that show 
up in the state LLC statutes include provisions based on standards of conduct 
applicable to corporate directors found in the [MBCA], provisions based on duties and 
standards set forth in the [RUPA] .... "). 
160. See RIBSTEIN & KEA TINGE, supra note 29, app. 9-7. 
161. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 171S3 (West 2006); 80S ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 180I1S-3(a) 
(West 2004). 
162. See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 409(a) (McKinney 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1024.1 (2006). 
163. The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act has multiple abbreviations, but 
for purposes of this comment, it will be referred to as RULLCA. On July 13, 2006, 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 
promulgated the enactment of RULLCA in all states. Daniel S. Kleinberger & Carter 
G. Bishop, The Next Generation: The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act, 62 Bus. LAW. SIS, S16 (2007). 
164. See id. at S19. 
16S. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1lOl(c) (200S). 
166. See id. 
167. 80S ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 180I1S-I(a)-{b) (West 2004). 
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approach to LLC fiduciary duties incorporates language virtually 
identical to that contained in RUP A. 168 The Illinois LLC Act 
provides that the duty of care and the duty of loyalty apply to both 
members and managers in an LLC. 169 
The language in Illinois's duty of loyalty provision for members in 
a member-managed LLC is almost identical to RUP A. 170 Also, 
Illinois's duty of care provision is similar to RUPA, applying a gross 
negligence standard of care to members in a member-managed 
LLC. 171 
168. Compare UN1F. P'SH1P ACT § 404(a), 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997) ("The only fiduciary duties 
a partner owes to the partnership and other partners are the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c)."), with 805 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 
180/15-3(a) (West 2004) ("The fiduciary duties a member owes to a member-
managed company and its other members include the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
care referred to in subsections (b) and (c) of this Section."). 
169. 805 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 180/15-3(a) (West 2004). 
170. Compare UNIF. P'SH1P ACT § 404(b), which provides that 
[a] partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other 
partner's is limited to the following: (I) to account to the 
partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or 
benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of 
the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of 
partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership 
opportunity; (2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the 
conduct or winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf 
of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; and (3) to 
refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the 
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership. 
with 805 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 180/15-3(b) (West 2004), which provides that 
[a] member's duty of loyalty to a member-managed company and 
its other members includes the following: (I) to account to the 
company and to hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or 
benefit derived by the member in the conduct or winding up of the 
company's business or derived from a use by the member of the 
company's property, including the appropriation of a company's 
opportunity; (2) to act fairly when a member deals with the 
company in the conduct or winding up of the company's business 
as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the 
company; and (3) to refrain from competing with the company in 
the conduct of the company's business before the dissolution of 
the company. 
171. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(c) ("A partner's duty of care to the partnership and 
the other partners in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business is limited 
to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional 
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law."), with 805 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 
180/15-3(c) (West 2004) ("A member's duty of care to a member-managed company 
and its other members in the conduct of a winding up of the company's business is 
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In a manager-managed LLC, a manager is held to the same duty of 
loyalty and duty of care standards as a member in a member-
managed LLC. 172 But members in a manager-managed LLC do not 
owe any duties to the company or to other members because of their 
status as members. 173 However, if a member exercises managerial 
authority, then he or she is held to the same duties as a manager. 174 
Finally, similar to the RUP A model of fiduciary duties, the Illinois 
LLC statute contains a provision that prevents the complete 
elimination of fiduciary duties. 175 However, parties may list 
categories or specify types of activities that do not violate the 
duties. 176 The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
referenced the nonwaiveable provision in Thorpe v. Levenfeld, l77 
where a member of an LLC was suing another member and the LLC 
for breach of fiduciary duties. 178 The court held that while parties 
could contract around provisions in the LLC, they could not 
completely eliminate a member's fiduciary duties.179 The court 
reasoned that the defendants were unable to point to any provisions in 
the operating agreement that set out "specific types of categories or 
activities" that did not violate fiduciary duties. 180 Therefore, the 
plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty was not dismissed. 181 
2. California's Approach to Fiduciary Duties 
The California LLC statute draws a clear distinction between a 
member-managed and a manager-managed LLC. 182 A California 
limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, 
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation oflaw."). 
172. 80S ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1S-3(g)(2) (West 2004). 
173. !d.180/1S-3(g)(I). 
174. [d. I 80/1 S-3(g)(3). 
17S. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § I 03(b )(3)(i) ("The partnership agreement may not: ... 
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) ... but: (i) the partnership 
agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the 
duty ofloyaJty, if not manifestly unreasonable ... "), with 80S ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 
180I1S-S(b)(6)(A) (West 2004) ("The operating agreement may not: ... (6) eliminate 
or reduce a member's fiduciary duties, but may: (A) identify specific types or 
categories of activities that do not violate these duties, if not manifestly unreasonable . 
. . . "). 
176. 80S ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. I 8011 S-S(b)(6)(A) (West 2004). 





182. CAL. CORP. CODE § 171S0 (West 2006). 
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LLC will only be considered manager-managed if the parties 
expressly state so in the operating agreement. 183 
California took an approach similar to Illinois in articulating a 
fiduciary standard. 184 While California's LLC statute does not 
contain identical fiduciary duty language to that found in RUP A, 
California's statute does state in plain terms that the fiduciary duties 
owed in an LLC are the same as those owed in a partnership. 185 
Some commentators have noted that the likely purpose behind 
articulating a fiduciary standard such as the one California follows is 
due to the small amount of case law that is available for the LLC. 186 
By articulating a fiduciary standard that is based on another business 
entity's approach, there is much more case law available for courts to 
rely upon when making a decision. 187 In addition, applying a 
partnership fiduciary standard to the LLC seems proper because the 
LLC in many respects is similar to the partnership. 188 Like 
partnerships, an LLC is likely to be closely held and have substantial 
participation by members in the management of the LLC. 189 
B. LLC Statutes Adopting the Corporate Approach to Fiduciary 
Duties 
Other state LLC statutes have fashioned their fiduciary duty 
provisions after the corporate model. 190 This comment will analyze 
Virginia and New York's LLC statute, both of which draw a 
distinction between a member-managed and a manager-managed 
LLC and incorporate an express fiduciary duty provision. 
183. Id. 
184. Seeid. § 17153. 
185. Id. § 17150 ("If management is vested in the members, each of the members shall 
have the same rights and be subject to all duties and obligations of managers as set 
forth in this title."); id. § 17153 ("The fiduciary duties a manager owes to the limited 
liability company and to its members are those of a partner to a partnership and to the 
partners of the partnership. "). 
186. See, e.g., Andrew J. Glendon, California's Limited Liability Company Act Gets a 
Facelift, 28 PAC. L.J. 635 (1997). 
187. !d. at 640 ("These partnership fiduciary duties [in California's LLC Act] are governed 
by the Uniform Partnership Act (UP A) . . .. Although this fiduciary rule may seem 
unable to address all of the potential issues that may arise, much partnership case law 
exists that speaks to many, ifnot most, of the possible issues that may arise."). 
188. !d.; see also Gevurtz, supra note 9, at 268 ("Generally, the decision to incorporate 
partnership, rather than corporate, law rules of fiduciary duty seems sensible."). 
189. Glendon, supra note 186, at 640. 
190. See R1BSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 29, app. 9-7. 
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1. Virginia's Approach to Fiduciary Duties 
Virginia's LLC statute draws a clear distinction between a 
member-managed and a manager-managed LLC. 191 Pursuant to 
section 13.1-1022(A) of Virginia's LLC statute, the default 
management structure for an LLC is member-managed unless the 
parties state otherwise in the articles of organization or the operating 
agreement. 192 Because the default management structure is member-
managed, the same fiduciary duties that apply to managers in a 
manager-managed apply to members in a member-managed LLC. 193 
The Virginia LLC statute favors the corporate approach to 
fiduciary duties, combining the codified best interests language from 
the MBCA with the common law business judgment rule. 194 Section 
13.1-1024.1 articulates that the decision of a manager of an LLC 
must be in the best interest of the LLC and is subject to the business 
judgment rule. 195 
The Virginia courts, in applying section 13.1-1024.1, have drawn 
analogies to the fiduciary duty standard in corporations. 196 In Flippo 
v. esc Assocs. IlL LLC,197 the LLC at issue, Flippo Land & Timber 
Co., LLC (FLTC), consisted of three members: Arthur Flippo, Carter 
Flippo, and CSC Associates III, L.L.C., which was formed to hold 
the Flippos' sister Lucy's children's interest. 198 When Carter and 
Arthur's attempt to create separate LLCs to hold their interest was 
rejected by CSC Associates, Carter decided to enter a joint venture 
with a corporation and transfer all of his assets to the new LLC, 
called Timber Enterprises. 199 Carter also informed CSC Associates 
that under the terms of the operating agreement, his actions would 
lead to the dissolution of FL TC. 200 The Virginia Supreme Court 
191. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.l-1022(A)(2006). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2009) ("Each member of the board of 
directors, when discharging the duties ofa director, shall act: (I) in good faith, and (2) 
in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation."), with VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024.1 (2006)("A manager shall discharge 
his or its duties as a manager in accordance with the manager's good faith business 
judgment of the best interests of the limited liability company."). 
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024. I (A)(2006). 
196. Szto, supra note 10, at 69 (discussing that Virginia courts have shown a preference for 
a corporate duty of care standard for LLCs). 
197. 547 S.E.2d 216 (Va. 2001). 
198. Id. at 219-20. 
199. Id. at 220. 
200. Id. 
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found that Carter had acted for his own personal benefit and not in 
the best interest of FL TC. 201 Therefore, the court found that the 
defendant, as manager of the LLC, had breached his statutory 
fiduciary duty. 202 
2. New York's Approach to Fiduciary Duties 
New York's LLC statute draws a clear distinction between a 
member-managed and a manager-managed LLC. 203 Pursuant to 
section 401(a), it is presumed that the LLC will be member-managed 
unless the parties clearly state in the operating agreement that the 
LLC will be manager-managed. 204 
The New York LLC Act also incorporates a fiduciary duty standard 
that encompasses features from the corporate mode1. 205 New York's 
LLC statute contains express fiduciary duties that were intended to 
follow the corporate mode1. 206 The language from section 409(a) of 
New York's LLC Act holds managers of an LLC to an objective 
good faith standard. 207 
The New York Supreme Court applied this standard in Nathanson 
v. Nathanson. 208 In that case, a member sued the manager of his LLC 
claiming that the manager had entered into a transaction that was for 
his own personal benefit and not in the best interests of the LLC. 209 
The court cited section 409(a), finding that a manager of an LLC 
must perform his duties in good faith and with the care of an 
ordinarily prudent person in a similar position. 210 
20 I. Jd. at 221 ("A manager, like a corporate director, is required to discharge his duties in 
accordance with his 'good faith business judgment of the best interests of the limited 
liability company." (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.I-1024.I(A) (2006))). 
202. Jd. at 222. 
203. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 401(a) (McKinney 2007). 
204. Jd. 
205. See id. §§ 409(a), 417(a). 
206. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2009) ("Each member of the board of 
directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (I) in good faith .... "), 
and MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) ("The members of the board of directors or a 
committee of the board ... shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a 
like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances."), 
with N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 409(a) (McKinney 2007) ("A manager shall perform 
his or her duties as a manager, including his or her duties as a member of any class of 
managers, in good faith and with that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person 
in a like position would use under similar circumstances."). 
207. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 409(a) (McKinney 2007). 
208. 799 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
209. !d. at 85. 
210. !d. at 84-85. 
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Additionally, New York's LLC statute contains a provision that 
prevents the contractual elimination of fiduciary duties, which is 
similar to the provision found in the MBCA. 211 Like the MBCA, the 
parties may specify particular acts that will not be considered 
violations of the duties, but they may not completely eliminate their 
fiduciary duties. 212 
C. LLC Statutes Adopting the Hybrid Approach to Fiduciary 
Duties 
Some state LLC statutes have incorporated a fiduciary standard that 
combines features from both the partnership and corporate models. 213 
This comment will analyze the LLC model act (RULLCA), which 
draws a distinction between member-managed and manager-managed 
LLCs and incorporates an express fiduciary duty provision. 
1. RULLCA's Approach to Fiduciary Duties 
RULLCA was developed in response to the growing concern that 
diversity in state LLC laws might create problems for interstate 
LLCs. 214 As a result, an attempt to develop a uniform state LLC 
statute began immediately following the recognition of the LLC's tax 
status.215 Unfortunately, many states had already adopted LLC 
statutes prior to the development of a standardized LLC statute. 216 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated the first standardized LLC statute, 
entitled the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA), 217 in 
1996.218 ULLCA was revised on July 13, 2006,219 when the 
211. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2009), with N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW 
§ 417(a) (McKinney 2007) ("The operating agreement may set forth a provision 
eliminating or limiting the personal liability of managers to the limited liability 
company or its members for damages for any breach of duty in such capacity .... "). 
212. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 417(a) (McKinney 2007). 
213. See Ribstein, supra note 6, at 17-18 (describing the various components LLC statutes 
borrow from partnership and corporate models). 
214. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 33, at 1183. 
215. Jd. 
216. Jd. 
217. The NCCUSL is responsible for circulating uniform state laws for partnerships 
(RUPA), limited partnerships (RULPA), and limited liability companies (RULLCA). 
See NCCUSL, http://www.nccusl.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
218. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 33, at 1183. 
219. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, NCCUSL, http://www.Iaw.upenn. 
edulblVuIc/ullcal2006acCfinal.htm (last visited Jan. 10,2011). 
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NCCUSL approved the enactment of RULLCA. 220 Presently, only 
two states have adopted RULLCA. 221 
Baltimore Law Review 
RULLCA contains statutorily enumerated types of fiduciary duties 
that are identical to the types of fiduciary duties contained in 
RUP A. 222 In applying fiduciary duties, RULLCA also draws a clear 
distinction between a member-managed and a manager-managed 
LLC. 223 Under section 407(a) of RULLCA, an LLC is considered to 
be member-managed unless the parties expressly state in the 
operating agreement that the LLC will be manager-managed. 224 
RULLCA's duty of loyalty provision for a member-managed LLC 
is also identical to RUP A in that it prohibits or limits four specific 
types of conduct. 225 First, fiduciaries are not to take profits for 
themselves that were earned by the LLC. 226 Second, fiduciaries 
220. ld. 
221. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 33, at 1183. 
222. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a), 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997) ("The only fiduciary duties 
a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c)."), with REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. 
ACT § 409(a), 6B U.L.A. 488 (2006) ("A member of a member-managed limited 
liability company owes to the company and, subject to Section 901(b), the other 
members the fiduciary duties ofloyalty and care stated in subsections (b) and (c)."). 
223. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 407(a). 
224. ld. 
225. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b), which provides that 
[a] partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other 
partners is limited to the following: (I) to account to the 
partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or 
benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of 
the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of 
partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership 
opportunity; (2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the 
conduct or winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf 
of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; and (3) to 
refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the 
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership, 
with REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(b), which provides that 
[t]he duty of loyalty of a member in a member-managed limited 
liability company includes the duties: (I) to account to the 
company and to hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or 
benefit derived by the member ... (2) to refrain from dealing with 
the company in the conduct or winding up of the company's 
activities as or on behalf of a person having an interest adverse to 
the company; and (3) to refrain from competing with the company 
in the conduct of the company's activities before the dissolution 
of the company. 
226. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(b)(I)(A). 
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cannot take an LLC opportunity for themselves. 227 Third, a fiduciary 
must refrain from dealing with the LLC when their interests are 
adverse to the LLC's interests. 228 Finally, a fiduciary must refrain 
from directly competing with the LLC. 229 RULLCA's duty of loyalty 
provision in a manager-managed LLC applies the same standard as 
that contained in a member-managed LLC, except that the duties only 
apply to the managers and not to members. 230 
RULLCA's duty of care provision in a member-managed LLC 
combines the common law business judgment rule with the codified 
duty of care provision found in the MBCA. 231 As with the corporate 
duty of care, managers of LLCs following RULLCA are held to act 
with reasonable care and in the best interests of the company in 
becoming informed of their monitoring and oversight duties. 232 
RULLCA's duty of care provision for a manager-managed LLC 
incorporates the same fiduciary standard applied to members in a 
member-managed LLC, except that only managers, and not members, 
are held to the fiduciary standard. 233 
There has been some criticism over RULLCA's duty of care 
provision. 234 One commentator felt that adopting the business 
judgment rule as part of the duty of care "[ r ]isks infecting the LLC 
227. Id. § 409(b)(1)(C). 
228. !d. § 409(b)(2). 
229. !d. § 409(b)(3). 
230. !d. § 409(g)(1)-(2) ("In a manager-managed limited liability company, the following 
rules apply: (1) [sJubsections (a), (b), (c), and (e) apply to the manager or managers 
and not the members. (2) [t]he duty stated under section (b)(3) continues until the 
winding up is completed."). 
231. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2009), which provides that 
[t]he members of the board of directors or a committee of the board, when 
becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function or 
devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties 
with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe 
appropriate under similar circumstances, 
with REVISED UN1F. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(c), which provides that 
[s]ubject to the business judgment rule, the duty of care of a member-
managed limited liability company in the conduct and winding up of the 
company's activities is to act with the care that a person in a like position 
would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner 
the member reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
company. 
232. Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The "New" Fiduciary Standards Under the Revised 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: More Bottom Bumping from NCCUSL, 61 
ME. L. REv. 27, 37 (2009). 
233. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(g). 
234. See Campbell, Jr., supra note 232, at 35-42. 
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duty of care with other misdirected concepts that courts (principally 
Delaware courts) have layered on the business judgment analysis.,,235 
Instead, according to this commentator, a better approach would be to 
modify RULLCA's duty of care and adopt a clearly articulated 
negligence standard of care. 236 
However, not everyone has criticized RULLCA's duty of care 
provision; there are some who feel that RULLCA's approach 
provides the "best of both worlds" by incorporating a reasonable care 
in the becoming informed standard with the business judgment 
rule. 237 The content and force with which the business judgment rule 
is applied will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but this was the 
intent of the drafters since the rule's application will vary depending 
on the nature of the challenged conduct. 238 Furthermore, the business 
judgment rule, under the law of several jurisdictions, applies to the 
various business organizations in a similar manner. 239 Therefore, the 
rule is broad enough so that the formality of the organizational choice 
is less important in shaping the application of the rule than is the 
nature of the conduct challenged. 240 
RULLCA does contain a provision that allows parties to limit or 
specify activities that will not violate the duty of care or loyalty. 241 
However, there are limitations on the opt-out provision similar to 
RUP A, mainly the prevention of completely eliminating the duty of 
care or the duty of loyalty. 242 
D. Delaware's Approach to Fiduciary Duties 
The Delaware LLC statute draws a distinction between a member-
managed LLC and a manager-managed LLC. 243 The default 
235. Id. at 39. 
236. Id. at 42. 




241. REVISED UN IF. LTD. LIAS. Co. ACT § 1I0(d), 6B u.L.A. 443 (2006) ("If not 
manifestly unreasonable, the operating agreement may: ... (2) identify specific types 
or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty; (3) alter the duty of 
care ... (4) alter any other fiduciary duty, including eliminating particular aspects of 
that duty .... "). 
242. "An operating agreement may not: ... (4) subject to subsections (d) through (g), 
eliminate the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, or any other fiduciary duty .... " /d. § 
110(c). 
243. Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, the 
management of the limited liability company shall be vested in its members in 
proportion to the then current percentage ... if a limited liability company 
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management authority is vested in the members unless the LLC 
agreement confers management authority in a manager. 244 
Delaware's LLC statute does not contain express fiduciary duties; 
instead, it embraces the idea of complete freedom of contract. 245 
Section 18-1101 (c) articulates the duties that a member or a manager 
owes to the LLC. 246 The express language in the Delaware statute 
allows for the expansion, restriction, or even complete elimination of 
fiduciary duties. 247 The Delaware LLC Act was amended in August 
2004 to include the express power to contractually eliminate 
fiduciary duties. 248 A reason for the amendment was in response to 
agreement provides for the management, in whole or in part, of a limited 
liability company by a manager, the management of the limited liability 
company, to the extent so provided, shall be vested in the manager .... 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2005). 
244. Id. 
245. Id. § 18-1101 (b) ("It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company 
agreements."). 
246. Id. § 18-1 101 (c). Section 18-IIOl(c) provides that 
Id. 
247. Id. 
[t]o the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or 
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited 
liability company or to another member or manager or to another 
person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability 
company agreement, the member's or manager's or other person's 
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions 
in the limited liability company agreement; provided, that the 
limited liability company agreement may not eliminate the 
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
248. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1 101 (c)(2) (1999), amended by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 
18-1 101 (c) (Supp. 2004), provides that 
[t]o the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or 
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited 
liability company or to another member or manager or to another 
person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability 
company agreement, the member's or manager's or other person's 
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions 
in the limited liability company agreement[.] 
See also Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited 
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 14-15 (2007) 
(discussing the August 2004 amendment to Delaware's Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act and the impact it would have on the LLC Act); Miller, supra note 39, 
at 578 (discussing that the Delaware Legislature revised its Limited Liability 
Company Act to permit parties to not only expand or restrict, but also eliminate duties 
including fiduciary duties at law or in equity). 
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the Delaware Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the 
Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 249 
Prior to the August 2004 amendment, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held in Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.p. 250 
that a limited partnership agreement could not completely eliminate 
the fiduciary duties of a general partner. 251 In its holding, the 
Delaware Supreme Court strongly criticized the lower court for its 
lack of reliance on the plain language of the statute. 252 The lower 
court relied on section 17-1101(d)(2), which stated, "[T]he partner's 
or other person's duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted 
by provisions in the partnership agreement." 253 The Delaware 
Supreme Court reasoned that nowhere in section 17-1101(d)(2) or in 
the rest of the statute does it state that a limited partnership agreement 
may eliminate the fiduciary duties of a general partner. 254 
The Gotham case serves as an example where both the lower and 
higher courts believed that they were giving effect to the legislature's 
intent, but in the end reached different results. 255 While the Gotham 
case did not deal with LLCs, the fiduciary duty language contained in 
the LP statute was identical to the language in the LLC statute. 256 
Therefore, when the Delaware legislature amended the language in 
the limited partner statute, the identical language in the LLC statute 
was also amended. 257 
V. THE MARYLAND LLC AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
In many ways, Maryland's LLC statute is different from other LLC 
statutes because it neither distinguishes between a member-managed 
and a manager-managed LLC nor includes an express fiduciary duty 
provision. 258 
Maryland's LLC statute does not draw a clear distinction between a 
member-managed and a manager-managed LLC. 259 Instead, section 
249. Steele, supra note 248, at 11. 
250. 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002). 





256. See Miller, supra note 39, at 578. 
257. See id. 
258. See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A (LexisNexis 2007) (omitting 
any distinction between a member-managed and manager-managed LLC as well as 
any express fiduciary duty provision). 
259. See generally id. (reviewing Maryland's LLC statute reveals that there is no mention 
of member-managed or manager-managed anywhere). 
2010] Incorporating Fiduciary Duties Into Maryland's LLC Act 315 
4A-402(a)(1) states that members may enter into an operating 
agreement to regulate the manner in which the LLC will be managed, 
controlled, and operated, which may include granting authority to 
manage to other persons who are not members.26o This provision 
effectively provides for something very similar to the member-
managed or manager-managed models because the provision allows 
for the articles of organization to remove general agency authority 
from the members. 261 Therefore, while the express language of the 
statute does not refer to the member-managed and manager-managed 
distinction, the ability to take away express authority in the articles of 
organization allows a Maryland LLC to operate as member-managed 
or manager-managed. 262 
Maryland's approach to fiduciary duties is unlike that contained in 
partnership or corporate statutes and various other LLC statutes. 263 In 
fact, Maryland's LLC statute does not even contain the termjiduciary 
duty. 264 The closest provision in this regard is section 4A-405, 
entitled "Business transactions of member with limited liability 
company.,,265 It states that "[ e ]xcept as provided in the operating 
agreement, a member may lend money to and transact other business 
with the limited liability company and, subject to other applicable 
law, has the same rights and obligations with respect to the 
transaction as a person who is not a member. ,,266 It could be argued 
that this language serves as a fiduciary duty provision; however, it 
260. Id. § 4A-402(a). Section 4A-402(a) provides that 
Id. 
261. See id. 
262. See id. 
[e ]xcept for the requirement set forth in § 4A-404 of this subtitle 
that certain consents be in writing, members may enter into an 
operating agreement to regulate or establish any aspect of the 
affairs of the limited liability company or the relations of its 
members, including provisions establishing: (I) [t]he manner in 
which the business and affairs of the limited liability company 
shall be managed, controlled, and operated, which may include 
the granting of exclusive authority to manage, control, and operate 
the limited liability company to persons who are not members .... 
263. RIB STEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 29, app. 9-7. 
264. See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 4A (reviewing the entire Maryland 
LLC statute reveals that the term "fiduciary duty" is not found anywhere); see also 
RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE, supra note 29, app. 9-7 (providing an overview of each 
state's approach to member's duties). 
265. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-405. 
266. Id. 
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does not clearly articulate any type of fiduciary standard to which 
members are held. 267 
Another provision that discusses the authority of LLC members is 
found in Section 4A-401(a)(1), which states that "[e]xcept as 
provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection or in the operating 
agreement, each member is an agent of the limited liability company 
for the purpose of its business.,,268 This provision, like 4A-405, does 
not articulate a clear fiduciary standard; instead it applies agency law 
to the members. 269 
While it is clear that Maryland's LLC statute does not contain an 
express fiduciary duty provision, an argument could be made that 
Maryland's statute relies on the principles of agency law. 270 Prior to 
its enactment, the Maryland LLC Act included section 4A-40 1 (E), 
which clearly laid out the agency relationship.271 Section 4A-40 1 (E) 
stated the following: 
(E) Except as otherwise agreed, a member, to the extent 
the member acts as an agent of the limited liability 
company, shall hold as trustee for it, any profits that the 
member derives without the consent of the limited liability 
company from a transaction connected with the formation, 
conduct or liquidation of the limited liability company or 
from the member's use of its property.272 
The House Bill, as finally enacted, struck out 4A-401(E) entirely.273 
Commentary to section 4A-401 mentions that subsection (E) was 
deleted from the Act prior to enactment because the Committee 
believed that the usual rules of the agency relationship would be 
applicable to members of the LLC when acting as agents. 274 
267. See id. 
268. Id. § 4A-401(a)(1). 
269. Id. §§ 4A-401(a)(I), 4A-405. 
270. See ROBERT M. ERCOLE, STUART LEVINE, MARSHALL B. PAUL & DARYL J. SIDLE, 
MARYLAND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FORMS AND PRACTICE MANUAL app. G2, at 
28-29 (3d ed. 1999). 




274. ERCOLE ET AL., supra note 270, app. G-2, at 28-29. The Restatement of Agency Law 
defines agency as "[t]he fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 
'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on 
the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests 
assent or otherwise consents so to act." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 
(2006). 
2010] Incorporating Fiduciary Duties Into Maryland's LLC Act 317 
Furthermore, the Committee believed that the fiduciary obligations of 
the members would not be altered by the deletion of subsection 
(E).275 An October 30,1991, draft of section 4A-401(E) included the 
heading "Fiduciary Obligations of Member"; however, the heading 
was crossed out and ultimately dropped along with the entire 
section. 276 As such, it could be argued that the commentary 
discussing the reasons for striking section 4A-401(E) and the ultimate 
decision to remove the term "fiduciary" from the heading of section 
4A-401(E) demonstrated that the principles of agency law would be 
sufficient for establishing the fiduciary duties among members in a 
Maryland LLC.277 
The agency relationship includes an express fiduciary standard. 278 
Section 8.01 of the Restatement of Agency Law articulates the 
general fiduciary principle: "An agent has a fiduciary duty to act 
loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the 
agency relationship.,,279 Thus, under agency law, the agent at a 
minimum owes a duty of loyalty to the principal. 280 
Two Maryland cases that address fiduciary duties in the Maryland 
LLC context include Froelich v. Erickson 281 and Robinson v. GEO 
Licensing CO. 282 In Froelich, the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland upheld an operating agreement that assigned its 
LLC directors the same fiduciary duties as corporate fiduciaries 
under Maryland law. 283 The court rationalized that the LLC board's 
decisions were protected from second-guessing by the business 
judgment rule. 284 The only way that the court would overturn the 
275. ERCOLE ET AL., supra note 270, app. 0-2, at 28-29. 
276. H.D. 373,1992 Leg. (Md. 1992). The draft, as edited, provided as follows: 
!d. 
Section 4A-401(E) Fiduciary Obligatises sf Member - Except as 
otherwise agreed, a member, to the extent the member acts as an 
agent of the limited liability company, shall account to the limited 
liability company for any benefit and hold as trustee for it, any 
profits the member derives without the consent of the limited 
liability company from aey transaction connected with the 
formation, conduct, or liquidation of the limited liability company 
or from the member's use of its property. 
277. See ERCOLE ET AL., supra note 270, app. 0-2, at 28-29. 
278. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). 
279. Id. 
280. Id. 
281. 96 F. Supp. 2d 507 (D. Md. 2000). 
282. 173 F. Supp. 2d 419 (D. Md. 2001). 
283. Froelich, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
284. Id. at 521. 
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LLC board's decision would be if there was proof that the board had 
acted in bad faith.285 The court accepted the parties' contractual 
corporate fiduciary standard and found that the LLC board had acted 
in the best interest of the LLC, thus not violating its fiduciary 
duties. 286 
In Robinson, the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland, citing Froelich, would again hold that a majority-interest 
holder owes a fiduciary duty to an LLC's minority interest holders 
because the operating agreement adopted corporate fiduciary duties 
like in Froelich. 287 Froelich and Robinson demonstrate that 
Maryland courts will give full effect to the fiduciary duties stated in 
the operating agreement. However, there is uncertainty as to what 
the court will do in situations where the operating agreement does not 
contain express fiduciary duties. 
VI. FIDUCIARY DUTIES NEED TO BE WRITTEN INTO THE 
MARYLAND LLC ACT 
The view that Maryland's LLC statute does not need an express 
fiduciary standard because it relies on the principles of agency law is 
flawed. 288 When comparing the fiduciary duty provision in 
Maryland's LLC statute to various other LLC statutes, it becomes 
clear that the Maryland judiciary and LLC owners face potential 
statutory interpretation problems in the future. 289 Not only does the 
lack of statutory rules regarding fiduciary duties present problems for 
the judiciary and LLC owners, but incorporating an express standard 
would create a clear minimum standard to follow that would not 
frustrate the purpose behind the LLC. 290 
A. Maryland Courts and LLC Owners Face Potential Statutory 
Interpretation Problems 
Without express fiduciary duties, the Maryland courts face greater 
statutory interpretation problems than courts in Delaware have 
faced. 291 Cases such as Froelich and Robinson demonstrate that 
Maryland courts will rely on the express fiduciary standard contained 
285. Id. 
286. Seeid. 
287. Robinson, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 427 ("Geophone is organized as an LLC and Robinson 
is a member of the LLC. Robinson, as Geophone's majority interest holder, owes a 
fiduciary duty to Geophone's minority interest holders."). 
288. See supra Part V. 
289. See supra Part III-IV. 
290. See infra Part VI.B. 
291. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text. 
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in the operating agreement in determining if there was a breach of 
fiduciary duty.292 The problem lies in what Maryland courts will do 
when an LLC operating agreement does not contain an express 
fiduciary duty provision. Commentators have noted that Maryland 
courts are at liberty to apply the law of agency generally and to 
analogize to partnership or corporate law as they see fit, depending 
on the circumstances. 293 Although Maryland courts are free to apply 
agency law, it is unclear what specific duties agency law calls for, 
whether that be a partnership or a corporate fiduciary standard. 
This uncertainty can create problems for lawyers advising clients 
on the potential outcomes in a given case. 294 It can also create 
outcomes that the legislature did not intend when drafting the 
statute. 295 The Gotham case serves as an example of this type of 
situation where the statutory language was unclear, and courts were 
left to wrestle with its true meaning, ultimately leading the legislature 
to amend the statute. 296 
In contrast to both Delaware and Maryland, courts applying the 
model act or following Virginia, Illinois, California, and New York 
law are not left to their own judgment. 297 Instead, these statutes 
supply clear language that the court can use to determine whether the 
possible violation falls within the statute. 298 Also, by having an 
express fiduciary duty provision, courts in Virginia, Illinois, 
California, and New York are able to determine from the language of 
the statute whether it is necessary to apply partnership or corporate 
common law to a given case. 299 
Another potential problem facing Maryland's LLC statute is the 
uncertainty that exists with a provision in the operating agreement 
that either eliminates or reduces any agency fiduciary duties. 
Because there is no explicit provision in Maryland's LLC statute that 
permits or prevents the raising or lowering of fiduciary duties, 
practitioners face the potential problem of predicting whether the 
courts will uphold such a provision. 300 Unlike partnerships and 
292. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text. 
293. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 5, at 634-35 n.85. 
294. Id. at 632. 
295. Id. 
296. See supra Part IV .D. 
297. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra notes 160--62 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. 
300. See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A (LexisNexis 2007). Maryland's 
LLC statute does not contain any language allowing for the raising or lowering of 
fiduciary duties. See id. 
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corporations, drafters of LLCs lack certainty as to what they can and 
cannot do. 301 Therefore, in order for Maryland courts to avoid 
statutory interpretation problems, the Maryland General Assembly 
should amend the Maryland LLC Act to incorporate an express 
fiduciary duty provision. 
B. Writing Statutorily Enumerated Fiduciary Duties into the 
Maryland LLC Act Creates a Minimum Standard or Duty That 
Does Not Frustrate the Purpose Behind the LLC. 
Incorporating statutorily enumerated fiduciary duties into the 
Maryland LLC Act would also serve to create a minimum standard or 
duty by which members and managers could be held to. 302 This 
standard would not detract from the flexibility offered by the LLC 
because the standard could still be raised or lowered, similar to a 
partnership. 303 Currently, it is unclear whether there is any minimum 
fiduciary standard contained in Maryland's LLC statute.304 While the 
legislative history of Maryland's LLC statute references agency law, 
it is uncertain whether Maryland courts would follow this.305 Even if 
Maryland courts do decide to follow agency law, LLCs may 
nevertheless be able to completely eliminate the duties. The official 
commentary to RUPA section I03(b)(3)-(5) notes that the inability to 
completely eliminate fiduciary duties creates a fundamental core 
fiduciary responsibility for partners. 306 Another commentator has 
noted that the inclusion of a minimum standard serves to protect the 
unsophisticated and inexperienced participant. 307 By having a 
minimum standard of fiduciary duties contained in the agreement, 
business owners unaware of this problem can still enter an agreement 
and have their interests protected. 308 
The purpose behind the creation of the LLC was to create a new 
entity that offered the taxation benefits of a partnership with the 
limited liability of a corporation. 309 Both partnerships and 
301. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404, 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997) (outlining the general standards 
of partners' conduct within a partnership), and MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2009) 
(outlining the standards of conduct for directors within a corporation), with MD. CODE 
ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A (LexisNexis 2007) (providing no specific standards of 
conduct for members of an LLC). 
302. See supra Part IV. 
303. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3)-(4). 
304. See supra Part IV. 
305. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text. 
306. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3)-(5), cmt. 4. 
307. Hynes, supra note 58, at 45. 
308. See id. 
309. See supra Part II. 
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corporations include statutorily enumerated fiduciary duties; thus, 
incorporating statutorily enumerated fiduciary duties into Maryland's 
LLC statute is consistent with, and does not frustrate, the purpose of 
the LLC. 3JO 
Another primary reason for the creation of the LLC was to allow 
business owners the flexibility to develop a management style that 
suited their personal business needs.311 This flexibility is still 
available even when incorporating an express fiduciary standard. 312 
Thus, the inclusion of a minimum fiduciary duty provision does not 
hinder the flexibility of the LLC; instead, it creates a minimum 
standard for LLC members and managers to be held. 313 
VII. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR 
MARYLANDLLCS 
This comment proposes a multi-faceted express fiduciary standard 
that creates a minimum duty to which members or managers must 
adhere to, while not compromising the flexibility of the LLC. This 
standard will consist of four parts: (1) incorporating an express 
fiduciary duty provision; (2) allowing for the election in the articles 
of organization a fiduciary standard that is similar to duties found in a 
partnership or a corporation;314 (3) allowing for the chosen standard 
to be raised or lowered, but not completely eliminated;31S and (4) 
applying the fiduciary duties to all those acting with managerial 
power. 316 
By utilizing language that clearly articulates a fiduciary standard, 
Maryland would signal the importance of fiduciary duties in the LLC 
and that fiduciary duties do in fact apply to Maryland LLCs. 317 As a 
result, courts would not need to waste time determining this issue, 
and it would provide a degree of certainty for LLC owners in forming 
and operating an LLC.318 Under the first element, similar to a 
310. See UN1F. P'SHIP ACT § 404; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2009). 
311. Miller, supra note 40, at 1610. 
312. See, e.g., 80S ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 180/IS-S(b)(6)(West 2004). 
313. See Miller, supra note 40, at 16S3-S4. 
314. See generally supra Part IV.A-B (describing partnership and corporate approaches to 
fiduciary duties in the context of an LLC). 
31S. See generally supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (describing the restrictions 
on eliminating the duties of care and loyalty under RUP A). 
316. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (describing the application of 
fiduciary duties to those with managerial power in an LLC context). 
317. See, e.g., Curwin, supra note 8, at 1016. 
318. [d. 
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partnership, the fiduciary standard would include the duty of care and 
the duty of loyalty. 319 
Under the second element of the standard, business owners would 
be given the freedom to choose to incorporate a fiduciary standard 
that contains language similar to the duties in a Maryland 
partnership320 or a Maryland corporation,321 any of which would 
eliminate the confusion for members of an LLC, the judiciary, and 
practitioners. 322 If the contracting parties choose not to specify 
fiduciary duties in their operating agreement, then pursuant to the 
first element of the standard, the express statutory fiduciary duties 
from a partnership would apply.323 Incorporating a fiduciary standard 
that emulates the standard found in a partnership or a corporation 
serves to create more predictability and efficient interpretation and 
application of the statute for judges and lawyers. 324 Commentators 
have noted that when judges and practitioners are faced with a rule 
they recognize from the partnership or corporate context, they are not 
forced to formulate an analysis on a blank slate; instead, they can 
refer to precedent. 325 However, this does not mean that judges and 
practitioners must rely solely on partnership and corporate law in 
analyzing an LLC. 326 Instead, in order for LLC law to further 
develop, judges and lawyers must think outside the partnership and 
corporate box. 327 
The proposal's third element still allows for the flexibility enjoyed 
by the LLC, but prevents the complete elimination of fiduciary 
duties. Similar to a partnership, creating a statutory fiduciary duty 
that can either be raised or lowered, but not eliminated, allows the 
contracting parties the freedom to determine what type of fiduciary 
standard will apply, but also provides for a minimum duty. 328 The 
parties can choose to have a heightened fiduciary standard. 329 In the 
alternative, where the parties want a more relaxed fiduciary standard 
and if the parties choose the partnership standard, then the parties can 
specify certain categories that do not violate the fiduciary 
319. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
320. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text. 
322. Miller, supra note 5, at 631-32. 
323. See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
324. Miller, supra note 5, at 631-32. 
325. [d. 
326. /d. 
327. /d. at 632. 
328. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
329. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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provision. 330 If the parties choose the corporate standard, then they 
can expand or limit but not completely eliminate the fiduciary 
duties.33\ Preventing the complete elimination of fiduciary duties 
serves to create a minimum standard of conduct that does not inhibit 
the flexibility offered by the LLC. 332 
The fourth element of the proposed standard applies the fiduciary 
standard to all those acting with managerial authority. 333 The Illinois 
LLC Act serves as an example of this standard, where it applies the 
fiduciary duties to all those members acting with managerial 
authority in a manager-managed LLC. 334 The Maryland LLC statute 
does not clearly distinguish between a member-managed and a 
manager-managed LLC, thus it should incorporate a standard similar 
to Illinois's LLC statute, which applies fiduciary duties to all those 
acting with managerial authority. 335 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While thirty-seven state LLC statutes have incorporated an express 
fiduciary duty provision, other LLC statutes, such as Maryland's, 
have not. 336 The inclusion of an express fiduciary duty provision in 
the Maryland LLC Act will aid in preventing uncertainty,337 develop 
a minimum standard to hold LLC members and managers 
accountable to, and not frustrate the purpose behind the LLC. 338 All 
of these reasons are consistent with partnership and corporate statutes 
and various other LLC statutes. 339 The purpose of this proposed 
330. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
331. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
332. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text. However, some commentators 
object, noting that the requirement of a minimum standard of fiduciary duty restricts 
the freedom the parties have to define their relationship in a way they see fit. See, 
e.g., Hynes, supra note 58, at 40. One commentator has noted that inclusion of a 
minimum standard in partnerships does have a drawback, which is to interfere with 
the rights partners have to define their relationship as they wish. ld. This 
commentator argues that persons entering a partnership relationship bargain from 
roughly equal positions, since each party usually has something the other desires. ld. 
This equal positioning should thus give presumptive validity to the bargain between 
the parties. ld. 
333. However, in the alternative, the fiduciary standard could apply to everyone in the 
LLC, similar to a partnership. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404, 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997). 
334. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
335. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
336. See RrnSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 29, app. 9-7. 
337. See supra Part VI.A. 
338. See supra Part VI.B. 
339. See supra Part III-IV. 
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standard is to assist in the continued development of Maryland LLC 
law by providing a flexible express fiduciary standard that 
incorporates existing language from either Maryland partnership or 
corporate law. 340 
Michael S. Spencer t 
340. See supra Part VII. 
t J.D. Candidate, May 2011, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to 
thank Professor Fred B. Brown for his guidance and feedback during the research and 
writing process. I would also like to thank my parents, John W. and Patricia Y. 
Spencer, for their unending support in the pursuit of my career. 
